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TIS ARTICLE IS limited to reviewing a substantial number of Seventh
Circuit administrative law decisions spanning the Fall of 1973 to the
Fall of 1974. The opinions reported encompass the following areas:

environmental law, food and drug law, immigration law, social security
benefits, housing and urban development, commerce, labor, and transportation. Particular emphasis is given to the manner in which adminThe topic "Administrative
istrative action is judicially reviewed.'

Law" has been interpreted to primarily, although not exclusively, in* Assistant Attorney General, State of Illinois; member of the Illinois Bar; J.D.,
University of Illinois College of Law.
* * Senior law student, 1IT/Chicago-Kent College of Law.
I. The Administrative Procedure Act sets out the manner in which administrative
action shall be reviewed. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1970) provides:
To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the reviewing
court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of
an agency action. The reviewing court shall(1) compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; and
(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise
not in accordance with law;
(B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity;
(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations,
or short of statutory right;
(D) without observance of procedure required by law;
(E) unsupported by substantial evidence in a case subject to sections 556 and 557 of this title or otherwise reviewed on the record
of an agency hearing provided by statute; or
(F) unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are
subject to trial de novo by the reviewing court.
In making the foregoing determinations, the court shall review the whole record or those parts of it cited by a party, and due account shall be taken of
the rule of prejudicial error.
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elude reported Seventh Circuit decisions reviewing final administrative

agency action.
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

In this area the Seventh Circuit had occasion to review the sufficiency of an agency's determination that an environmental impact
statement was unnecessary. The court also reviewed an Army Corps
of Engineers decision to proceed despite adverse environmental consequences.
Section 102(2)(C) of the National Environmental Policy Act of
1969 (NEPA)2 provides in pertinent part that:
All agencies of the ,Federal Government shall. . . include in every
recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other
major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the
human environment, a detailed statement by ,the responsible official on.

.

. the environmental impact of the proposed action.8

2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331 etseq. (1970).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1969) (emphasis added). The relevant portions of 42
U.S.C. § 4332 provide:
The Congress authorizes and directs that, to the fullest extent possible:
(2) all agencies of the Federal Government shall(A) utilize a systematic, interdisciplinary approach which will insure the
integrated use of the natural and social sciences and the environmental design
arts in planning and in decisionmaking which may have a [sic] impact on
man's environment;
(B) identify and develop methods and procedures in consultation with
the Council on Environmental Quality established by subchapter II of this
chapter, which will insure that presently unquantified environmental amenities
and values may be given appropriate consideration in decisionmaking along
with economic and technical considerations;
(C) include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the
human environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action.
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should
the proposal be implemented.
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action.
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment
and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which
would be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented.
Prior to making any detailed statement, the responsible Federal official shall
consult with and obtain the comments of any Federal agency which has jurisdiction by law or special expertise with respect to any environmental impact
involved. Copies of such statement and the comments and views of the appropriate Federal, State, and local agencies, which are authorized to develop and
enforce environmental standards, shall be made available to the President, the
Council on Environmental Quality and to the public as provided by section 552
of Title 5, and shall accompany the proposal through the existing agency review processes;
(D) study, develop, and describe appropriate alternatives to recommended
courses of action in any proposal which involves unresolved conflicts concerning alternative uses of available resources;
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In First National Bank of Chicago v. Richardson,4 the General Services
Administration (GSA) had partially completed construction of a Federal parking garage and detention center (the Chicago Annex) on the

south fringe of the Chicago Loop" when plaintiffs' brought suit to enjoin construction pending preparation of a detailed environmental impact statement (EIS). The district court denied preliminary and per-

manent injunctive relief.
The issue on appeal was whether construction of the partially
completed Chicago Annex should be enjoined pending the preparation
of an EIS, or whether GSA had satisfied NEPA requirements by issuing a detailed environmental "Assessment" intended to show that this
"major Federal action" was not one significantly affecting the quality
of the human environment. The Seventh Circuit followed the Second
Circuit's analysis in two factually similar cases, Hanly J7 and Hanly II.8
The Hanly cases dealt with the construction of a Federal office
building with an adjoining detention center. The Hanly I court noted
that since not all agency action required the preparation of an EIS:
[T]he responsible federal agency has the authority to make its own

threshold determination as to . . . [whether the federal action is

major and also has a significant effect on the environment] in deciding whether an impact statement is necessary."
In Hanly I, GSA attempted to meet NEPA requirements on the basis
of a four page memorandum,' 0 but the Second Circuit reversed the
district court's denial of preliminary injunctive relief, holding that, as
to the detention center:
4. 484 F.2d 1369 (7th Cir. 1973).
5. The Chicago Annex detention center is being built on a square block bounded
by Van Buren, Clark, Congress Parkway and Federal Streets, on the south fringe of the
downtown Chicago business district or "Loop" in a blighted area of deteriorating buildings including "flophouses," adult book stores, arcades, liquor stores and taverns, interspersed with several new non-residential office and business buildings such as the Illinois
Bell Telephone Building, the Western Union Building, the Federal Reserve Bank and
many others. The Annex is in close proximity to the five major downtown Chicago
federal buildings. It is five blocks from the Chicago Civic Center and state courthouses
and six blocks from the City Hall and County Buildings.
6. Plaintiffs were various banks, organizations, and individuals using the area to
be affected by the construction of the Chicago Annex.
7. Hanly v. Mitchell, 460 F.2d 640 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 990
(1972).
8. Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908
(1972).
9. 460 F.2d at 641.
10. GSA had attempted to justify the detention center on the basis of the same
abrupt memorandum which had satisfactorily terminated environmental attacks on the
office building.
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[I]n the context of an Act designed to require federal agencies to
affirmatively develop a reviewable environmental record, this perfunctory and conclusory language simply does not suffice, even for
purposes of a threshold section 102(2)(C) determination.,
The Hanly I court determined that GSA must at least consider those
factors peculiar to detention centers which have an impact on the urban
environment.
In First National Bank, GSA attempted to use a similar four page
memorandum to satisfy its threshold determination that the Chicago
Annex would not significantly affect the quality of the human environment. As the Second Circuit did in Hanly I, the Seventh Circuit remanded to the district court with directions to enter an injunction effective within thirty days unless in the interim GSA adequately supplemented its threshold environmental impact assessment. If this supplemental assessment was not adequate, an injunction was to be entered and continued in force until an EIS was made in full compliance
with section 102(2)(C) of NEPA.
Upon remand in First National Bank GSA invited and received
environmental objections to the Chicago Annex and thereafter filed a
142-page supplemental assessment supported by a large number of
exhibits. The district court found that the 142-page assessment considered all relevant factors and clearly supported GSA's determination
that an EIS was unnecessary. The district court denied plaintiffs'
prayers for preliminary and permanent injunctions and plaintiffs appealed.
The Seventh Circuit again looked to the Second Circuit for guidance. After remand in Hanly I, GSA filed a 25-page supplemental
assessment which supported its original threshold determination that an
EIS was unnecessary. The New York district then denied plaintiffs'
renewed application for a preliminary injunction and the Hanly H appeal followed. Since NEPA is silent as to judicial review, the Second
Circuit relied on the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)1" for reviewing GSA's supplemental assessment and held:
Although a court reviewing administrative action must determine
de novo all questions of law, must determine whether factual findings are 'arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise
not in accordance with law' or 'without observance of procedure
required by law.

. . and must accept the administrative agency's

decisions as to mixed questions of law and fact if they have 'war11. 460 F.2d at 647.
12. 5 U.S.C. §§ 706(2)(A), (2)(D) (1970).

ADMINISTRATIVE

LAW

rant in the record' and a 'reasonable basis in law'. . . the arbitrary
and capricious standard should apply to NEPA exemption determinations since 'significantly' as used in Section 102(2)(C) can be
isolated as a question of law.' 3
The Hanly II court then formulated a two part test to determine environmental "significance":
(1) the extent to which the action will cause adverse environmental effects in excess of those created by existing uses in the
areas affected by it, and (2) the absolute quantitative adverse environmental effects of the action itself, including the cumulative
harm that results from its contribution
to existing adverse condi14
tions or uses in the affected area.
The Seventh Circuit applied the Hanly I test to GSA's 142-page assessment and concluded that GSA had affirmatively developed a reviewable environmental record' 5 which supported GSA's threshold
determination that the Chicago Annex would not significantly affect
the quality of the human environment. The Court found that GSA's
threshold determination passed muster under the "arbitrary and capricious test," and affirmed the judgments of the district court denying the
preliminary and permanent injunctions.
A possible problem raised by First National Bank is that given
the fact that the agency makes the threshold determination of "significance," query under what circumstances will the court require the EIS
mandated by section 102(2)(C) of NEPA. In Hanly I, the Second
Circuit repeatedly referred to the 25-page supplemental assessment as
satisfying GSA's responsibility for developing a reviewable record in
that the assessment closely paralleled in form an EIS. 6 The Seventh
Circuit did likewise and deemed its 142-page Assessment to be even
"more penetrating and critical"'17 than the 25-page assessment in Hanly ii.
The real issue is, then, what is the proper standard for judicial
review of an agency's threshold determination not to file an EIS under
NEPA? The Seventh Circuit articulates the "arbitrary and capricious"
standard much like the Second Circuit, as opposed to the "reasonableness" test' 8 employed by the Fifth' 9 and Tenth2" Circuits. Examina13. 471 F.2d at 828-29.
14. Id. at 830-31.
15. The Court determined that GSA's 142-page supplemental assessment was "obviously not a 'rewrite' of the original 4-page draft." 484 F.2d at 1381 n.19.
16. 471 F.2d at 832.
17. 484 F.2d at 1381 n.19.
18. Under the "reasonableness" test, the court must determine whether the plaintiff
bas alleged facts which, if true, show that the recommended project would materially
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tion of the court's opinion reveals that GSA's assessment was subject
to thorough scrutiny by both the district court and 'the Seventh Circuit.
One gets the distinct impression that the court concluded that GSA's
threshold determination was not unreasonable. Accordingly, at this
point it is not clear whether there is any practical difference in approach by the circuits in reviewing such determinations. If anything,
First National Bank clearly illustrates the court's insistence on a
thorough administrative record and complete lack of tolerance for pro
forma compliance.
In Sierra Club v. Froehlke,21 the Seventh Circuit was asked to
decide whether a final section 102(2)(C) environmental impact statement complied with the mandates of NEPA. The EIS was prepared
by the Army Corps of Engineers prior to commencing construction of
a dam creating a reservoir which would inundate twelve miles of picturesque bluffs and sandstone ledges containing rare floral plants.
Plaintiffs filed suit in the district court 22 alleging, in effect, that
the Corps' EIS was inadequate in violation of section 102 of NEPA,
and that continuation of the project should be enjoined under the
APA. 23 The district court found that the EIS "provided adequate notice to all concerned persons, agencies, and organizations, of the probable environmental consequences of the proposed project," and denied
plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. Summary judgment was
entered for the Corps and plaintiffs appealed. The Seventh Circuit
affirmed.
degrade any aspect of environmental quality. The court should proceed to examine and
weigh the evidence of both the plaintiff and the agency to determine whether the agency

reasonably concluded that the particular project would have no effects which would significantly degrade our environmental quality. This inquiry must not necessarily be limited to consideration of the administrative record, but supplemental affidavits, depositions and other proof concerning the environmental impact of the project may be considered if an inadequate evidentiary development before the agency can be shown. If
the court concludes that no environmental factor would be significantly degraded by the
project, GSA's determination not to file the impact statement should be upheld.

On the

other hand, if the court finds that the project may cause a significant degradation of
some human environmental factor (even though other environmental factors are affected
beneficially or not at all), the court should require the filing of an impact statement.
19.

Save Our Ten Acres v. Kreger, 472 F.2d 463 (5th Cir. 1973).

20. Wyoming Outdoor Coordinating Council v. Butz, 484 F.2d 1244 (10th Cir.
1973).
21. 486 F.2d 946 (7th Cir. 1973).
22. Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 345 F. Supp. 440 (W.D. Wis. 1972).
23. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970), which provides:
A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute,

is entitled to judicial review thereof.
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Plaintiffs' arguments on appeal were twofold. First, plaintiffs alleged that the Corps did not properly weigh or consider various factors
in preparing the EIS. The Corps countered that plaintiffs' real concern
was that the Corps' decision-makers did not accord some factors the
weight plaintiffs would assign them, and argued that it "is obviously
not required to give the same weight to plaintiffs' concern as plaintiffs
do, ...
and that some bias is even to be expected. 24 The Seventh
Circuit agreed with the Corps. They recognized, however, that the
EIS must provide "a record upon which a decision-maker could arrive
at an informed decision,"2 5 and determined that the test for compliance
with section 102 of NEPA was good faith objectivity: "Federal agencies are required to demonstrate objectivity in the treatment and consideration of the environmental consequences of a particular project. ' 28
Since this test was more exacting than the "notice of problems" test
employed by the district court, the court re-examined the district court's
finding of compliance in light of the "objectivity" standard and found
that
[i]f this were the only finding made by the district court, we might
be inclined to agree with plaintiffs' argument. However, the court
also found that plaintiffs had not shown a sufficient probability of
success on the merits as to their 'contention that the statement in its
present form does not constitute 'full disclosure' of the environmental consequences of -the project' as required by NEPA.
The court also concluded that plaintiffs have 'failed to show
a sufficient chance of success on the merits of a contention that the
present statement is not a record
upon which a decision-maker
27
could make an informed decision.
The Seventh Circuit interpreted the district court's opinion as finding
that the Corps objectively and comprehensively considered the environmental consequences of the proposed project.
Plaintiffs' second argument was that district courts have an obligation to review an agency's decision to proceed with a project where
an admitted adverse environmental impact is revealed in the EIS.
Several circuits had recently held that such an obligation existed.28
24. 486 F.2d at 950. See also Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Eng., U.S.
Army, 470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 931 (1973), where the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals stated: "NEPA assumes as inevitable an institutional
bias within an agency proposing a project and erects the procedural requirements of §
102 to insure that "there is no way [the decision-maker] can fail to note the facts and
understand the very serious arguments advanced by plaintiffs if he carefully reviews the
entire environmental impact statement."
25. 486 F.2d at 950.
26. Id.
27. 486 F.2d at 951.
28. The Fourth Circuit has expressly adopted the holding of the Eighth Circuit.
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For the Seventh Circuit this was a point of first impression, so the court
looked to the other circuits for guidance. The court adopted the reasoning of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals:
Given an agency obligation to carry out the substantive requirements of the Act, we believe that courts have an obligation to review substantive agency decisions on the merits.
NEPA is silent as to judicial review, and no special reasons
appear for not reviewing the decision of the agency. To the contrary, the prospect of substantive review should improve the quality
of agency decisions and should make
2 9 it more likely that the broad
purposes of NEPA will be realized.
As to the specific standard of review to be applied, the court likewise
adopted the test set out by the Eighth Circuit:
The reviewing court must first determine whether the agency
acted within the scope of its authority, and next whether the decision reached was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with law. -Inmaking the latter determination, the court must decide if the agency failed to consider all
relevant factors in reaching its decision, or if the decision itself
represented a clear error in judgment.
Where NEPA is involved, the reviewing court must first determine if the agency reached its decision after a full, good faith
consideration and balancing of environmental factors. The court
must then determine, according to the standards set forth in §§101
(b) and 102(1) of the Act, whether the actual balance of costs
and benefits that was struck was arbitrary or clearly gave insufficient weight to environmental values.30
It is worthy of note that both First National Bank and Sierra Club
arise in the context of substantially completed construction projects.
Both cases clearly were major actions. Certainly, in Sierra Club it
would have been difficult for the court to have concluded that the
Corps' decision to proceed was a clear error of judgment, if for no other
reason than the difficulty of fashioning judicial relief. Query the result
if the court had been presented with a project not yet under construction.
Conservation Council of North Carolina v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d 664, 665 (4th Cir.
1973). The Fifth Circuit and the District of Columbia Circuit appear to be in accord.
Save Our Ten Acres v. Kreger, 472 F.2d 463, 466 (5th Cir. 1973); Calvert Cliff's Coordinating Committee v. U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, 449 F.2d 1109, 1115 (D.C.
Cir. 1971).
29. Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Eng., U.S. Army, 470 F.2d 289, 29899 (8th Cir. 1972).

30. Id. at 300,
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FOOD AND DRUG LAW

In this area the court treated problems of safe DDT levels in food
destined for human consumption, condemnation of drugs for violation

of "current good manufacturing practices," and a claim of excessive
sanctions imposed for failure to keep required records. A common
thread weaving through the decisions is an apparent judicial deference
to agency expertise and policy. Accordingly, it appears that the Sev-

enth Circuit is wary of denying enforcement of agency orders in this
highly technical area.
In two cases during the past year the Seventh Circuit grappled
with the problem of DDT levels in fish caught in Lake Michigan. In
United States v. Goodman,31 defendants distributed in interstate commerce fish known as raw chubs, in which the total amount of DDT
and its derivatives exceeded the FDA's interim limit of five parts per
million (ppm). The FDA3 2 sought to have defendants permanently
33
enjoined under section 302(a) of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act

(FDCA) from further distribution in excess of the interim guideline
as violative of sections 301(a) 34 and 402(a)(2)(B). 15
At trial the parties stipulated that DDT and its derivatives were

pesticide chemicals under section 408(a)3 6 and that there was neither
31. 486 F.2d 847 (7th Cir. 1973).
32. Pursuant to Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970, effective December 2,
1970, EPA was established and there was transferred to it . . . the functions
vested in the Secretary of HEW of establishing tolerances for pesticide chemicds' under FDCA, together, with authority 'to monitor compliance with the
tilerances and the effectiveness of surveillance and enforcement.'
However, the Secretary of HEW continues to administer FDCA except for
EPA's establishing of tolerances for pesticide chemicals, and inasmuch as EPA
only "monitor(s) compliance," the Secretary of HEW continues to enforce
compliance. The FDA has acted as the delegate of the Secretary of HEW in
enforcing the pesticide tolerances promulgated by EPA. Id. at 848-49.
33. 21 U.S.C. §§ 331 et seq., § 302(a) (1970), § 302(a) of the FDCA, provides
in pertinent part:
(a) Jurisdiction of courts. The district courts of the United States and the
United States courts of the Territories shall have jurisdiction, for cause shown,
. . to restrain violations of section 301 [21 U.S.C. § 3311, except paragraphs
(h), (i), and (j).
34. § 301(a) of the FDCA, 21 U.S.C. § 331 (1970), provides in pertinent part:
The following acts and the causing thereof are hereby prohibited:
(a) The introduction or delivery for introduction into interstate commerce
of any food, drug, device, or cosmetic that is adulterated or misbranded.
35. § 402(a)(2)(B), 21 U.S.C. § 342(a) (2) (B) (1970), provides:
A food shall be deemed to be adulterated-if it is a raw agricultural commodity and it bears or contains a pesticide chemical which is unsafe within
the meaning of section 408(a) [21 U.S.C. § 346(a)].
36. § 408(a) of the FDCA, 21 U.S.C. § 346a (1970), provides in pertinent part:
(a) Any poisonous or deleterious pesticide chemical, or any pesticide chemical
which is not generally recognized, among experts qualified by scientific training
and experience to evaluate the safety of pesticide chemicals, as safe for use,
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a regulation nor an exemption excusing defendants from compliance
with the interim guideline. Expert testimony indicated that DDT in
excess of five ppm was not generally recognized as safe. The district
court concluded that raw chubs containing DDT in excess of five ppm
were adulterated within the meaning of section 402(a)(2)(B) and enjoined defendants from further distribution.
On appeal, defendants argued that under section 408(a) the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) must establish by regulation
permissible tolerances of DDT and its derivatives in fish before injunctive relief could be granted. Defendants further contended that a
permanent injunction issued pursuant to interim standards promulgated
by FDA denied them the review procedures of sections 408(d)(3) and
408(e).11 The Seventh Circuit rejected defendants' arguments and
held that section 408(a) "clearly provides that a pesticide chemical
which is not generally recognized as safe for use, added to raw agricultural commodity, shall be deemed unsafe unless EPA has established
a tolerance or provided for exemption."3 " The court found that defendants' own lack of initiative was responsible for their being denied
FDCA review procedures."
The court further reasoned that:
Since there is no tolerance or exemption for DDT in fish, any
amount of this poisonous pesticide chemical must be deemed unsafe and result in an adulterated product under a literal interpretation of the statute. Yet it is obvious that at the present time all
fish cannot be banned
inasmuch as it would seriously affect the
40
total food supply.
Since FDCA provided specific authority empowering FDA to refrain
from prosecuting minor violations, 4 the court gave defendants the opadded to a raw agricultural commodity, shall be deemed unsafe for the purposes
of the application of clause (2) of section 402(a) [21 USC § 342(a)(2)]
unless(1) a tolerance for such pesticide chemical in or on the raw agricultural commodity has been prescribed by the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare
under this section and the quantity of such pesticide chemical in or on the raw
agricultural commodity is within the limits of the tolerance so prescribed; or
(2) with respect to use in or on such raw agricultural commodity, the pesticide
chemical has been exempted from the requirement of a tolerance by the Secretary under this section.
37. 21 U.S.C. §§ 346a(d)(3), 346a(e) (1970).
38. 486 F.2d at 854 (emphasis added).
39. "The defendants, who could hardly have been unaware of the growing national
concern over DDT content in fish, could have triggered the rule making procedure under
21 U.S.C. § 346a(e) if they had but requested it." Id.
40. Id. at 855.
41. 21 U.S.C. § 336 (1970).
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portunity to continue operating if they could distribute fish with five
or less ppm of DDT residue. The court concluded that FDA had the
authority under FDCA to abide by the interim guidelines until such
time as the EPA developed tolerance standards. Accordingly, the
judgments of the district court were affirmed.
The consolidated appeals of United States v. Ewig Bros. and
United States v. Vita Food Products42 presented the question of
whether residues of DDT and dieldrin in smoked chubs4" were "food
additives" within the meaning of section 201(s) of FDCA. 44 Defendants contended that DDT was not an item added to their products, but
rather was a natural component of the fish before they were caught,
let alone processed. They argued that a process such as smoking, during which nothing new was added to a food, could not "transmogrify"
a preexisting component of a food into an additive. The Seventh Circuit disagreed, saying:
Although it may seem odd to place the label additive on a chemical
substance which was a component of the raw produce and which is
not changed by processing, Congress' choice of that label does not
result in any .transmogrification. Before processing, DDT is a
pesticide chemical on a raw product: after processing, it is an additive. Since there is no tolerance of DDT on fish, both before
and after processing the presence of DDT causes fish to be adulterated without any proof that it is actually unfit as food. Defendants' contention, if accepted, would result in the anomaly that a
chemical such as DDT would adulterate all raw fish, but adulteration of processed fish would be determined on an uncertain caseby-case basis. We conclude 45that such a construction of the statute
is illogical and unacceptable.
The court found that since the definition of a "food additive" was
broad enough to include any residue of a pesticide chemical remaining
in or on food after processing, the necessity for duplicate tolerances
in raw and processed commodities was avoided. Accordingly, the
42.
43.
44.
(s)

502 F.2d 715 (7th Cir. 1974).
The fish in Goodman were raw chubs.
§ 201(s) of the FDCA, 21 U.S.C. § 321(s) (1970), provides in pertinent part:
The term "food additive" means any substance the intended use of which

results or may reasonably be expected to result, directly or indirectly, in its
becoming a component or otherwise affecting the characteristics of any food

(including any substance intended for use in producing, manufacturing, pack-

ing, processing, preparing, treating, packaging, transporting, or holding food;

and including any source of radiation intended for any such use), if such substance is not generally recognized, among experts qualified by scientific training and experience to evaluate its safety, as having been adequately shown

through scientific procedures to be safe under the conditions of its intended use
...

. (Emphasis added).

45. 502 F.2d at 722.
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court applied the FDA's five ppm guidelines, observed that DDT and
dieldrin were not protected by any tolerance and thus held that the
smoked chubs were "adulterated" as a matter of law. Consequently,
defendants were enjoined from distributing smoked chubs containing
DDT in excess of five ppm.
The court was concerned that if five ppm of DDT in raw fish was
unsafe, then five ppm in processed fish could not be any less safe.
However, stretching the definition of "food additive" to encompass a
pre-existing component appears to be an obviously strained construction. Given the court's reasoning, the FDA, as the court suggests,48
may have, at least for the present, virtually unbridled power to eliminate all such fish from our food supply.
In United States v. An Article of Drug,4 7 defendant appealed from
a FDA order condemning his shipment of white quadrisect tablets, a
prescription drug under FDCA. The district court upheld the FDA's
order because defendant's production procedure violated the "current
good manufacturing practice" (GMP) provision of FDCA.4 8
Defendant contended that the GMP provision was unconstitutionally vague and denied him due process under the fifth amendment.
His argument attacked the statutory terms "current" and "good". The
Seventh Circuit found no merit in defendant's argument because the
FDA had promulgated detailed regulations 49 defining the precise requirements of GMP. The court concluded that the term "current good
manufacturing practice . . . adequately defines a standard which the
Administrator was authorized to particularize in interpretative regulations."5
The court recognized that the GMP provision stemmed from
congressional concern that dangerously impure drugs might escape
detection under a system predicated only on seizure of drugs shown
to be in fact adulterated. In order to insure public safety, Congress
determined that it was necessary to also regulate the means of production.5 The court determined that the GMP provision was as precise
as necessary under the circumstances and held that it was not uncon46. Id. at 717.
47. 484 F.2d 748 (7th Cir. 1973).

48. 21 U.S.C. § 351(a) (a) (B) (1970).
49.

21 C.F.R. § 133 et seq. (1974).

50. 484 F.2d at 749.
51. "[Tlhe Secretary's interpretative regulations as to good manufacturing practice
for purposes of judging the adequacy of the methods, facilities, and controls would be

prima facie evidence of what constitutes current good manufacturing practice in any
proceeding involving [§ 351(a) (2)] of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act as amended
by the bill." 1962 U.S. CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2890.

ADMINISTRATIVE

LAW

stitutionally vague in view of the FDA's detailed regulations. Accordingly, the court rejected defendant's semantical argument and affirmed
the condemnation judgment.
In River Forest Pharmacy v. Drug Enforcement Administration, petitioner had pleaded guilty to four counts of felonious distribution of controlled substances 53 and was placed on three years probation.
On the basis of petitioner's guilty pleas the DEA Administrator issued
an order to show cause why the pharmacy's Certificate of Registration
should not be revoked. Pending disposition of the matter, the Administrator ordered an immediate suspension of the registration pursuant
54
to section 824(a)(2) of FDCA.
52

At the hearing, the administrative law judge found that petitioner's failure to keep accurate records was due to forgetfulness, business
pressures, and unfamiliarity with the regulations promulgated by the
Administrator. The administrative law judge made findings of fact and
conclusions of law, and recommended a six-month suspension of the
registration. The Administrator accepted the findings of the administrative law judge, but instead imposed a two-year suspension, viewing
petitioner's violations of the drug laws as substantial rather than
"merely technical."5 5
Petitioner then sought direct review in the Seventh Circuit5 6 asserting that the Administrator's order increasing the suspension was
"arbitrary, capricious and an abuse of discretion" under the APA.5 7 In
reviewing the Administrator's sanction, the court deferred to his policy
determinations, stating:
52. 501 F.2d 1202 (7th Cir. 1974).
53. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1970).
54. 21 U.S.C. § 824(a) (2)(1970) provides that:
A regulation pursuant to section 823 of this title
to manufacture, distribute, or dispense a controlled substance may be suspended or revoked by the
Attorney General upon a finding that the registrant(2) has been convicted of a felony under this subchapter or subchapter II of this chapter or any other law of the United States, or of any
State, relating to any substance defined inthis subchapter as a controlled
substance ....
55. 501 F.2d at 1205.
56. 21 U.S.C. § 877 (1970), which provides:
All final determinations, findings, and conclusions of the Attorney General under this title
shall be final and conclusive decisions of the matters involved,
except that any person aggrieved by a final decision of the Attorney General
may obtain review of the decision inthe United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia or for the circuit inwhich his principal place of business islocated upon petition filed with the court and delivered to the Attorney
General within thirty days after notice of the decision. Findings of fact by
the Attorney General, ifsupported by substantial evidence, shall be cornclusive,
57. 5 U.SC § 706(2)(A) (1970).
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Although the law judge and not the Administrator was in the best
position to evaluate [the pharmacist's] credibility and demeanor,
those factors are irrelevant to an assessment of the seriousness of
petitioner's violations and of the sanction most appropriate for the
promotion of agency policy regarding them. 58
Petitioner argued that the Administrator was required to give a detailed
explanation of his reasons for increasing the suspension. The court
disagreed, finding:
The Administrator's decision, fairly read, does provide reasons why
the Administrator increased the sanction recommended by the law
judge. True, it does not explicitly announce why the Administrator imposed a two-year suspension rather than, say a twelve-month
or an eighteen-month suspension. However, we do not construe
5 U.S.C. §706(2) (A) as requiring so refined an explanation of his
exercise of discretion.5 9
In desperation, petitioner appealed to the court's "sense of fairness."
The court sympathized with petitioner, but felt constrained to enforce
the increased sanction, stating:
Neither section 824 nor the Administrative Procedure Act authorizes us to substitute our sense of fairness for the noncapricious decision of the regulatory agency.
Thus, while we might if we were reviewing de novo,

which We are not, determine that from the petitioner's individual
point of view the suspension was harsh, we cannot say that from
the point of view of overall enforcement, which is the Administrator's responsibility, there was an abuse of discretion.60
Accordingly, the court upheld the challenged order.
IMMIGRATION LAW

In this area the Seventh Circuit treated denials of alien employment certifications, discretionary suspension of deportation, statutory
discrimination between eastern and western hemisphere aliens, and the
impact of an illegal arrest on subsequent deportation proceedings. In
Secretary of Labor v. Farino,61 a prospective employer sought review
of the denial of an alien employment certification by the Regional Manpower Administrator. Section 212(a)(14) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act 62 authorized the Secretary of Labor6" to determine
58. 501 F.2d at 1206.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1206-07 (emphasis added).
61. 490 F.2d 885 (7th Cir. 1973).
62. 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (1965).
63. The Secretary of Labor has delegated this responsibility to the Regional Man.
power Administrator. 29 C.F.R. § 60.4 (1973).

ADMINISTRATIVE

LAW

whether there were sufficient qualified workers in the United States
available to perform the work sought, and whether the employment

of the alien would adversely affect the wage and working conditions
of United States workers.6 4 The district court reversed the denial and
ordered the certification to issue. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.
On appeal the government argued that alien labor certifications
had been committed by Congress to the Secretary's discretion, thus prohibiting review under section 10 of the Administrative Procedure
Act."' Moreover, the government argued that an employer lacked
standing to seek judicial review. 66

The Immigration Act was silent on the reviewability of alien labor
certifications. This, however, was not deemed controlling. After
examining the legislative history, the court held the Secretary's action
to be reviewable, applying the rationale of Citizens to Preserve Overton
Park v. Volpe. 67 Citizens made clear that non-reviewability of agency

discretion is a very narrow exception, applicable only upon a showing
of clear and convincing legislative intent to so restrict judicial review.68
Certainly, legislative silence did not help the government's argument.
The court made equally short shrift of the employer's alleged lack
of standing. Applying the test set forth in Association of Data Processing Service Organization v. Camp,6 9 the court found that the employer
had alleged economic injury if unable to employ the desired alien, but
64. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(14) (1970) provides in pertinent part;
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this Act, the following classes of
aliens shall be ineligible to receive visas and shall be excluded from admission
into the United States:
(14) Aliens seeking to enter the United States, for the purpose of performing skilled or unskilled labor, unless the Secretary of Labor has determined
and certified to the Secretary of State and to the Attorney General that (A)
there are not sufficient workers in the United States who are able, willing,
qualified, and available at the time of application for a visa and admission to
the United States and at the place to which the alien is destined to perform
such skilled or unskilled labor, and (B) the employment of such aliens will
not adversely affect the wages and working conditions of the workers in the
United States similarly employed.
65. Section 10 of the APA, 5 U.S.C.A. § 701(a) (1970) provides in pertinent
part:
This chapter applies, according to the provisions thereof, except to the extent that-(l) statutes preclude judicial review; or (2) agency action is committed to agency discretion by law.
66. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970) provides:
A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute
is entitled to judicial review thereof.
67. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
68. 401 U.S. at 410.
69. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
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more importantly, the court found that "potential employers of aliens
are within the zone of interests to be regulated" by the agency action. 0
The employer had claimed that the procedures and data used by
the Secretary in making his determination precluded him from effectively participating in or contributing to the decision making process.
The employer noted that the Secretary relied on unemployed persons
information compiled by the Illinois State Employment Service (ISES),
but he had been denied an opportunity to rebut this data. He also
pointed out that ISES did not verify the qualifications of those allegedly
available, or have any system for removing names from the available
list, and that ISES refused to provide the names and addresses of those
allegedly available. The court concluded: "If the report of the State
Employment Service stood unimpeached, we could not conclude that
the Secretary's refusal to certify the alien workers was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with
71
law."
The court set forth the procedures to be followed by the Secretary
in certification proceedings.7 2 While not requiring a trial type hearing,
the Secretary must make available all the information before him to
the employer. An opportunity to submit affidavits and written argument should also be afforded, particularly an opportunity to question
the reliability of information before the Secretary. Judicial review will
then be had on the record and if the denial is found to be "arbitrary,
capricious, [or] an abuse of discretion, 'then the district court should'
compel agency action unlawfully withheld by ordering the issuance of
73
the certification.1
In First Girl, Inc. v. Regional Manpower Administrator,74 another
panel of the court had occasion to apply the standard of review set forth
in Farino. The employer ran a temporary secretarial service and had
sought certification for three British stenographers. Denying the request, the Secretary relied on data submitted by ISES which indicated
70. 490 F.2d at 489.
71. Id. at 491. The court also disapproved of the Secretary's regulation prohibiting
disclosure of those allegedly available as being contrary to the Freedom of Information
Act. Id. at 493.
72. Id. at 492.
73. Id. While stating that the district court may not substitute its judgment for
that of the Secretary, nonetheless the district court must consider whether the Secretary's
decision was based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been
a clear error of judgment. The court must also consider whether the Secretary followed
proper procedures. Id. at 489.
74, 499 F.2d 122 (7th Cir. 1974).
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that secretaries were available. However, the record before the district
court did not indicate that the persons listed were in fact qualified, still
available or even willing to work in a temporary placement agency. 75
The district court, finding no reliable evidence to support the denial,
reversed and remanded. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.
The district court's decision was rendered prior to Farino, and had
looked to see if the Secretary had abused his discretion by ascertaining
"whether an examination of the administrative record reveals no evidence supporting defendant's decision." 7 6 Noting that the "substantial
evidence" test was not used, and properly so, the Seventh Circuit concluded that "a finding based upon no reliable evidence whatever is
a clear error of judgment and an abuse of discretion. ' 77 At least in
the Seventh Circuit there is no doubt that in future certification denials,
the administrative record will be subject to strict judicial scrutiny.
In Guzman-Flores v. United States Immigration and Naturalization Service, 8 a number of aliens petitioned for review of deportation
orders entered against them 'by the Board of Immigration Appeals.
Deportability was admitted. However, the issue on appeal was
whether an illegal arrest by city police on suspicion of alienage alone,
required suppression of their physical persons at subsequent INS hearings under the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine."
The Seventh
Circuit answered in the negative, noting that there was no evidence
seized at the admittedly illegal arrest that was used against petitioners.
The court cited United States v. Calandra,8" for the proposition that
"the (exclusionary) rule is a judicially created remedy designed to
safeguard Fourth Amendment guarantees by utilizing the technique of
suppression of evidence to achieve deterrence and not a rule to safeguard personal constitutional freedoms." 81 Continuing, the court
noted: "Historically the remedy for an unconstitutional arrest has been
a civil action for false arrest and false imprisonment." 82 The Seventh
Circuit found it to be a well established principle that the illegality of
an arrest does not destroy a later valid proceeding. 83 Accordingly, it
75.

361 F. Supp. 1339, 1340 (N.D. Ill. 1973).

76. Id. at 1341.
77. 499 F.2d at 124. Even if the "substantial evidence" test was used, the Secretary's denial could not have been upheld if based on "no evidence".
78. 496 F.2d 1245 (7th Cir. 1974).
79. 496 F.2d at 1246, 1247.
80. 414 U.S. 338 (1974).

81. 496 F.2d at 1247.
82. Id.

"3. 1d. at 1248,
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held that since petitioners admitted their deportability and since INS
did not rely on any evidence seized at the time of their arrests by local
authorities to establish deportability, that "even if -those arrests were
illegal, this does not invalidate the subsequent deportation proceed' 's
ings. 8
The difficulty with Guzman-Flores is that if the alien is deported
or allowed to voluntarily depart, his remedy of a civil action for false
arrest becomes illusory. However, it is to be noted that the reported
"flood" of illegal aliens into the United States poses a rather unique
problem for law enforcement authorities. The court did note that the
arrests in the case at bar were made by local and not immigration authorities. Given the deterrence rationale for suppression of evidence,
it is uncertain what the result would be if the arresting authorities had
been immigration officials.
In Pedroza-Sandovalv. Immigration and NaturalizationService,"8
petitioners raised an equal protection challenge to section 245(c) of
the Immigration Act 8 6 which provided that western hemisphere aliens
while illegally in the United States may not be allowed to adjust their
status to a lawfully admitted alien otherwise permitted, under certain
circumstances, to eastern hemisphere aliens.8 7 The court rejected
petitioners' attack noting that Congress has "broad powers," subject
to limited judicial review, on immigration policies because of the policy
mixture of foreign relations, war power, and maintenance of a republican form of government inherent in such legislation.8 8 The court concluded that immigration policy-making is best left to the political
branches of government. However, the court did find a rationale for
distinguishing between eastern and western hemisphere aliens. Western hemisphere aliens, geographically, have easier access to the United
89
States and therefore are more of a "recurring problem. 1
If we assume the propriety of immigration laws restricting admittance, then Congressional limitation on adjustment of status by western
84. id.
85. 498 F.2d 899 (7th Cir. 1974).
86. 8 U.S.C. § 1255(c) (1970).
87. Section 1255 generally provides that it is within the discretion of the Attorney
General to adjust the status of an alien to one of lawful permanent residence in certain
cases. One such case, as was claimed by petitioner, is where the alien claims to be an
immediate relative of a United States resident alien. However, section 1255(c) states
that "the provisions of this section shall not be applicable to any alien who is a native
of any country of the Western Hemisphere."
88. 498 F.2d at 900, relying on Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952).
89. 498 F.2d at 900-01.

ADMINISTRATIVE

LAW

hemisphere aliens would appear to be a realistic legislative response
to problems encountered in enforcement of immigration law. Unfortunately, an in depth examination of preferential treatment in immigration policy is beyond the scope of this article.
In Rassano v. Immigration and NaturalizationService,90 petitioner
sought review of the INS' denial of a discretionary suspension of his
deportation. Admittedly deportable, petitioner sought suspension of
deportation based on his showing of good moral character for the ten
year period preceding the act which gave rise to deportability in accordance with section 244(a)(2) of the Immigration Act.9 1 The precise issue was whether petitioner had met his burden of showing that
he was of good moral character thus warranting suspension of deportation.
The court noted that appellate review is for the purpose of determining whether the agency action was arbitrary or capricious or an
abuse of discretion. 2 "Whether we apply the reasonable, substantial
and probative evidence test on the record considered as a whole . . .
or consider that the decision is not based on a reasonable foundation
. . . .we are convinced that a mistake has been made. ' 93 The court
affirmed the order of deportation, but reversed the denial of the deportation suspension, noting that "this holding is limited to the unusual
factual situation present in this case and is not otherwise to be considered as precedent."9 4
Considering that the court's holding in any given case will necessarily reflect the facts before it, further examination of this case is obviously required. It appears that this case reflects the court's view that
the penalty of deportation was excessive under the circumstances.
Given the finding of deportability and given no alternative but to affirm
90. 492 F.2d 220 (7th Cir. 1974). Petitioner's case had been before the court before in 377 F.2d 971 (7th Cir. 1966) but on rehearing had been vacated and remanded.
91. Section 244(a) (2), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(2) (1970), provides in pertinent part:
The Attorney General may, in his discretion suspend deportation . . . in
the case of an alien who...

(2) is deportable ... , has been physically present in the United States
for a continuous period of not less than ten years immediately following the
commission of an act, or the assumption of a status, constituting a ground for
deportation, and proves that during all of such period he has been and is a
person of good moral character; and is a person whose deportation would, in
the opinion of the Attorney General, result in exceptional and extremely unsusual hardship to the alien or to his spouse, parent, or child, who is a citizen
of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence.
92. 492 F.2d at 227.
93.

Id. at 227-28.

94. Id. at 228.
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or reverse the court said: "To affirm here would be to exile this petitioner to a foreign country for the remainder of his life. To invoke
this extreme penalty under all the facts in this case relevant for consideration, in our considered judgment, goes too far."9
The INS had issued a "show cause" order on January 26, 1961.
Petitioner had been convicted of robbery in 1934, convicted of burglary in 1952, and arrested other times without conviction. Brought
here by his parents in 1914 at the age of six months, petitioner became a permanent resident of the United States. He married a United
States citizen and had two sons. His youngest son was killed in Vietnam in 1968.96 After reviewing the entire record on the issue of petitioner's good moral character, the Court concluded that "petitioner was
found to have failed to discharge his burden of good moral character
because of his association with Joseph Aiuppa. This appears to be a
clear case of guilt by association."9 7 However, the Service argued that
highly credible evidence linked petitioner "to gambling and prostitution
through his employment and investments." 98 The court characterized
such evidence as being inextricably comprised of fibers of hearsay and
guilt by association. 99 On balance, the scale tipped in favor of the petitioner "because of the events following the tragic loss of his son in Vietnam; in his earlier family care during his wife's prolonged suffering
from leukemia; and following her death, in the care of his young
00
sons."l
Had there been an alternative to deportation the Seventh Circuit
may have ruled differently. However, this is a difficult case to reconcile with the "clear error of judgment" standard. Perhaps, because
of the court's characterization of much of INS' character evidence as
hearsay, and presumably unreliable, the only remaining evidence in the
record was that which tended to show good moral character, thus supporting reversal.
SOCIAL SECURITY

The frequency and complexity of poverty law litigation has made
judicial review of welfare agency action increasingly important to applicants and recipients seeking to enforce statutory rights. Section 205
95. Id.
96. A more complete factual history is set out in 492 F.2d at 222-25.

97. Id. at 226.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 227.

100. Id,
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(g) of the Social Security Act' 01 provides that the substantial evidence
rule is the test to be applied on judicial review. Under this rule the
court's inquiry is limited to whether on the record as a whole the
agency could reasonably make the challenged factual finding. The
court decides questions of law de novo, but limits itself to the test of
reasonableness in reviewing findings of fact.' 2
An unexplained absence of over seven years gives rise to a pre03
sumption of death under a Social Security Administration regulation.1
In Blew v. Richardson,' plaintiff applied for children's insurance
benefits0 5 on her son's behalf eleven years after her husband had
abandoned them. An evidentiary hearing was had to determine
whether the husband's absence was "unexplained" within 'the meaning
of the regulation. Evidence was adduced that the husband had abandoned his family shortly after signing a child support agreement in
court in lieu of a jail sentence for non-support. The hearing examiner
determined that the husband's absence was not "unexplained" within
the meaning of the regulation, and based on this decision the Secretary
denied plaintiffs claim.
Plaintiff then sought review pursuant to section 205(g). The district court held that the presumption of death attached unless there was
evidence of continued life during the seven-year period. Summary
judgment was entered for the plaintiff and the Secretary appealed.
42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1970). Section 205(g) provides, in part:
Any individual, after any final decision of the Secretary made after a
hearing to which he was a party, irrespective of the amount in controversy,
may obtain a review of such decision by a civil action commenced within sixty
days after the mailing to him of notice of such decision or within such further
time as the Secretary may allow. Such action shall be brought in the district
court of the United States for the judicial district in which the plaintiff resides,
or has his principal place of business, or, if he does not reside or have his principal place of business within any such judicial district, in the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia.

101.

The court shall have power to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript or
the record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the
Secretary, with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing. The findings
of the Secretary as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be
conclusive.
102. K. C. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TEXT 525 (3d ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited

as DAvis].
20 C.F.R. § 404.705 (1974).
Whenever it is necessary to determine the death of an individual in order
to determine the right of another to a monthly benefit or a lump-sum payment
under section 202 of the Act, and such individual has been unexplainedly absent from his residence and unheard of for a period of seven years, the Ad-

103.

ministration, upon satisfactory establishment of such facts and in the absence
of any evidence to the contrary, will presume that such individual has died.
104. 484 F.2d 889 (7th Cir. 1973).
105. 42 U.S.C. § 402(d) (1970).
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The issue on appeal was whether an explanation which was found
in events preceding the absence could serve to defeat the presumption.
The Seventh Circuit answered this question in the affirmative, holding:
[Tihe text of the regulation itself quite plainly authorizes alternafive means of rebutting the presumption. The regulation requires
-that the individual be 'unexplainedly absent' and also 'unheard of'
for a seven year period. The presumption then applies 'in the absence of any evidence to the contrary.' A fair reading of this language indicates that the Secretary may adduce evidence to contradict either the unexplained character of the absence or the fact that
the individual has not been heard of for seven years.' 0 6
Finding that -there was substantial evidence to support the finding that
the husband's absence was not "unexplained," the court reversed for
the Secretary.
0 7 plaintiff applied
In Stark v. Weinberger,"
for disability benefits
under the Social Security Act. 1 8 At the time of her application plaintiff was clearly disabled within the meaning of the Act, but because
of the special earnings requirement of the statute, 1 9 the Secretary determined that she had to establish a period of disability commencing
no later than December 31, 1950.

Plaintiff suffered from scleroderma, a progressive, fatal disease
which causes extreme stiffness of the hands and is without cure. Prior
to 1951, plaintiff's only job had involved working with her hands on
an assembly line operation. At the agency hearing, plaintiff introduced uncontradicted medical testimony based on her symptomology
that her scleroderma "was present in and from the late 1930's. '110
Further medical evidence indicated that had her condition been properly diagnosed, she almost certainly would have been advised to discontinue work which could aggravate her condition."' The administrative law judge concluded that plaintiff's "attempts to work resulted
from severe economic need,""' 2 and found in her favor. The Appeals
Council reversed based on plaintiffs post-1950 employment and various post-1950 medical records. Plaintiff sought review under section
205(g). The district court entered summary judgment for the Secretary, and plaintiff appealed.
106. 484 F.2d at 893.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

497 F.2d 1092 (7th Cir. 1974).
42 U.S.C. §§ 416, 423 (1970).
42 U.S.C. § 416(i)(3)(B)(i) (1970).
497 F.2d at 1097.
Id. at 1100.
Id. at 1096.
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The dispositive issue on appeal was whether plaintiffs post-1950
employment constituted substantial evidence of non-disability as of December 31, 1950. The majority held that it did not. It was conceded
that plaintiff worked after 1950, but that was not held to preclude a
finding of disability within the meaning of the Act. The court independently examined the documentary medical evidence and concluded
that, viewed in its entirety, plaintiff was disabled. Judge Stevens recognized that while the normal procedure is to remand for further expert testimony, equitable considerations justified straight reversal. 1 '
Judge Pell filed a strong dissent. He could not find that any of
Judge Stevens' equitable considerations had been encompassed in the
statutory scheme so as to obviate the need for remandment. 11 4 Judge
Pell clearly deferred to the interpretations and inferences given the evidence by the Appeals Council, and emphasized that it was not the province of the court to redetermine the facts de novo:
Our only inquiry is to determine whether the Secretary's findings
of fact are supported by substantial evidence. Even if the court
should be of the opinion that documentary evidence can be reinterpreted by us, here the evidence fails to support a determination that the claimant met the disability requirement prior to
1951.115
The difference between Judge Pell's reasoning and that of the majority
lies in their treatment of questions of inferences. The majority turned
questions of inferences into questions of law," 6 thereby placing them
within the ambit of the court's proper scope of review.
Hassler v. Weinberger,"' another disability benefits case, was argued the same day as Stark before the same judges. 11 In Hassler,
plaintiff applied for benefits under the Act" 9 on the basis of physical
and mental disability. Proceedings before the agency revealed that
Hassler suffered from hypochondriacal symptoms and his claim was denied. With respect to the psychiatric evidence taken, the Appeals
113. Judge Stevens considered the rapidly deteriorating condition of the plaintiff;
the strength of the uncontradicted medical evidence favorable to plaintiff; the disproportionate cost of further proceedings to the amount at stake; and the settled policy of construing the statute favorably to the claimant. Id. at 1101.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1102-1103.
116. DAvis, supra note 102, at 533. Although the test for review of inferences is
reasonableness, not rightness, a court may always substitute judgment on what inference
to draw if its chooses to turn the question of inference into a question of law, for courts
often turn questions of fact into questions of law by creating law about them.
117. 502 F.2d 172 (7th Cir. 1974).
118. Circuit Judges Pell, Stevens, and Sprecher.
119. 42 U.S.C. § 423 (1970).
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Council stated: "[T]he claimant's functional capabilities because of a
nervous impairment are evaluated at only 15 percent disabling." The
Council affirmed the hearing examiner's decision, which affirmance
became the final decision of the Secretary. Plaintiff then sought review under section 205(g). Hassler argued that his mental impairments1 20 precluded him from engaging in any substantial gainful activities.12 1 The district court disagreed, and entered summary judgment
for the Secrctary, holding that the doctor's "determination that plaintiff
had only a fifteen percent (15%) mental impairment constituted more
than substantial evidence that the plaintiff did not have a mental impairment within the meaning of the Social Security Act."' 12 2 Plaintiff
appealed, the sole issue being whether his mental impairments were
so severe as to make him "disabled" within the meaning of the Act.
The Seventh Circuit rejected the Secretary's interpretation of the
doctor's report, and held that he had erroneously equated the degree
of mental impairment with the degree of functional disability. "The
Secretary may not rely on a portion of an expert's report where a fair
reading of the entire report indicates that the expert reached a conclusion contrary to that asserted by the Secretary."' 123 Since there was
no substantial evidence to counter the doctor's prognosis of total disability, the Secretary's decision was reversed. Here, as in Stark, the
court read the documentary evidence for itself and exercised its prerogative to draw its own inferences. Judge Pell, who had strongly dissented in Stark, not only joined the Stark majority but wrote the Hassler
opinion. Judge Pell reversed for the plain-tiff, but remanded to the
district court for further proceedings since the "equitable considerations" 24 found by Judge Stevens in Stark were seemingly absent in
Hassler.
120. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d) (3) (1970) provides in pertinent part:
[A] 'physical or mental impairment' is an impairment that results from
anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.
121. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A) (1970) provides in pertinent part:
The term 'disability' means inability to engage in any substantial gainful
activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be
expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months ....

Therefore, in order to qualify for disability benefits under the Act, a claimant must
show, first, that he is suffering from a medically determinable physical or mental impairment, and, second, that, due to this impairment, he is unable "to engage in any substantial gainful activity."
122. 502 F.2d at 175. In the district court Hassler primarily relied on mental impairment.

123. Id. at 178.
124. See note 113 supra.
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HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT

The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) survived two challenges in the Seventh Circuit this past year. Both cases
raised due process attacks against action taken by HUD in its capacity
as the mortgage insurer for private low income housing projects.
T.A. Moynihan Properties,Inc. v. Lancaster Village Corp.,12 5 provides a focus for a due process attack on agency action. The plaintiff
had entered into a property management contract for three years with
Lancaster. HUD was the mortgage insurer for Lancaster and, as such,
HUD and the mortgagee had the right to cancel the contract "with or
without cause."' 2 6 A dispute arose between plaintiff and Lancaster
which, to HUD, appeared irresolvable. On April 26, 1972, HUD,
without assessing fault, notified plaintiff of cancellation effective May
31, 1974. Prior to the effective date informal meetings were held between HUD and plaintiff to discuss the cancellation. HUD reaffirmed
its decision to cancel. Plaintiff filed suit, claiming violation of both
substantive and procedural due process rights as to -the manner and basis for the cancellation. The district court agreed and enjoined HUD
from further action.
Though the contract provided for cancellation with or without
cause, -the Seventh Circuit concluded that a substantive due process
standard was applicable in reviewing the cancellation. The court noted
that HUD had both "a financial interest, in a proprietary sense, and
a governmental interest, in terms of the public welfare, in successful
operation of the housing project."' x2 7 Since there was evidence in the
record to justify HUD's position that the dispute appeared to be irresolvable, the court agreed that HUD acted reasonably in order to insure
success of the project.
The Seventh Circuit agreed with plaintiff that he had a protected
property interest in the contract which gave rise to his procedural due
Noting that plaintiffs property right entitled
process contention.' 2
him to be protected from arbitrary action without a rational basis, the
court concluded that "the minimum requirements are a written statement of the reasons for the proposed action and an opportunity to present material at least in writing, challenging the accuracy of supposed
125.
126.
127.
128.

496 F.2d 1114 (7th Cir. 1974).
Id. at 1117.
Id.
Id. at 1118. Note the court rejected HUD's argument that plaintiffs' agreement

t cancellation "with or without cause" was a voluntary waiver of a hearing.
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facts relied on and the rationality of the reasons stated."1 2 9 Though
the initial written notice to plaintiff of April 26, 1972, was deemed inadequate, the Seventh Circuit concluded that because of the subsequent meeting between HUD and plaintiff, as well as the district court's
hearings, that plaintiff, in fact, had sufficient notice of reasons for cancellation as well as an opportunity to rebut the basis for cancellation,
thus curing the defects in the original notice. 3 °
From HUD's standpoint, one can simply conclude that in ownermanagement disputes the latter are obviously dispensable. From the
court's perspective, in the absence of allegations of racial, religious or
political discrimination, judicial intervention is unlikely beyond a narrow review of the commercial practicality of HUD action.
In South East Chicago Commission v. HUD,"' community residents sought to set aside the federal defendant's commitment for mortgage insurance and interest subsidization to a redeveloper for a low income housing project in the Kenwood area of Chicago. Upon learning
of the HUD commitment, plaintiffs were concerned that federal subsidization, which necessarily limited prospective tenancy to low income
persons, would bring a number of poor blacks into the Kenwood area,
upsetting its racial balance. It was felt that HUD had not given this
matter sufficient consideration. After HUD rejected their contentions,
plaintiffs filed suit claiming that the administrative findings were erroneous and not in accordance with law, that plaintiffs were denied procedural due process in that HUD's regional director was not an impartial
decision-maker and further that they were improperly denied crossexamination of witnesses.' 3 2 The district court,13 3 upon a narrow
review of the agency action, granted summary judgment for defendants.
The Seventh Circuit affirmed.
On appeal, plaintiff first attacked HUD's failure to apply its own
regulations, known as the Project Selection Criteria,13 1 in weighing
plaintiffs' objections to the federal commitment. These criteria, however, did not become effective until February 7, 1972. HUD, after
hearing plaintiffs' objections, reaffirmed its commitment on August 11,
1971 and construction was well under way at the time of filing of the
129. Id. The court is consistent in this approach.

See, e.g., Frietag v. Carter, 489

F.2d 1377 (7th Cir. 1973).
130. 496 F.2d at 1118.
131. 488 F.2d 1119 (7th Cir. 1973).
132. Id. at 1121.

133. The district court's decision is reported at 343 F. Supp. 62 (N.D. fI. 1972).
134. 24 C.F.R. § 200.700 et seq. (1974).
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instant suit." 5 The redeveloper had erected the building prior to the
court's decision and it was clear to the court that antecedent rights
would be disturbed by a retroactive application of the criteria. 136 The
court also noted 7that the regulation on its face contemplated only pro8
spective effect.1
Plaintiffs next contended that the HUD commitment was illegal
because of defendant's error of judgment "in weighing and analyzing
the facts," and "from a misapprehension . . . of the governing legal
standard."' 8 Specifically, plaintiffs claimed that federal defendants
gave lip service to the national housing policy concern for integrated
open housing, and further that they totally ignored the fact that public
or federally assisted housing in the area was "substantially all black in
occupancy."'' 9 Plaintiffs thus concluded that HUD's concern for low
and moderate income housing was too narrow40 and without regard for
perpetuating and increasing racial segregation.'
The Seventh Circuit stated that their review of the administrative
action taken was necessarily narrow and confined to a determination
of whether the administrative decision was "arbitrary, capricious, an
Reabuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law."''
[HUD]
efforts
error:
"That
not
show
clear
record
did
view of the
bore some risk of failure is not, we think, reason enough to overturn
them as a product of a clear error of judgment."' 4 2 Actually, upon
hearing of the plaintiffs' objections, HUD did take some measures in
an attempt to prevent racial concentration. However, as plaintiffs contended, these same measures had been demonstrated to have been ineffective in prior projects. Thus by the time the Seventh Circuit was
135. 488 F.2d at 1121, 1126. The opinion does not indicate what, ifany, construction or development had occurred at the time HUD entertained plaintiffs' objections to
the commitment.
136. Plaintiffs urged that the redeveloper "took his chances by electing to proceed
with construction in the face of their appeal of the HUD commitment to the district
pendens notice prior to execution of the contracts at issue.
court and their filing of a lis
488 F.2d at 1126, 1127. The Seventh Circuit stated, however, that preservation of the
status quo pending final judgment is the function of a preliminary injunction. "Having
failed to obtain this, the plaintiffs cannot complain of activity by the (redeveloper) after this suit was filed." Id.
137. Id. at 1127 n.9.
138. Id. at 1127.
139. Id. at 1128, 1130.
140. Id.
141. Id.at 1129; 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(a) (1970). The court made quite clear that
they would not apply the "substantial evidence" test in 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(e) (1970),
but rather adopted the more narrow review following the United Sttates Supreme Court
in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971).
142. 488 F.2d at 1131.
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called upon to decide the question, the court was presented with a completed, and presumably occupied, structure.
Plaintiffs finally contended that they were denied an impartial decision-maker in their appearance before HUD and were neither allowed cross-examination of witnesses nor sufficient access to information. Recognizing the inherent flexibility of due process requirements,
the court first observed: "It is curious, indeed, to find the plaintiffs
arguing for advanced procedural protections in a context where their
right even to a hearing is open to question."' 4 3 Treating the question
of cross-examination, the court appeared to characterize much of
HUD's action as involving "legislative" rather than "adjudicative" facts,
The court also
thus requiring "little need for cross examination.""'
could find nothing in the record indicating that HUD was partial to the
redeveloper.
However, HUD and the court did not dispute that plaintiffs' concerns were legitimate and should be taken into account. If judicial review is to be meaningful, it must be based on a sufficiently complete
administrative record. Therefore, it would seem that some opportunity
must be afforded, at the agency level, to properly put the question in
issue. It appears that the court went to great lengths in order to affirm.
One cannot help but ponder the result if the court had not been presented with a completed housing project.
COMMERCE

In Borden v. Federal Trade Commission,'45 FTC notified Borden
that it was investigating whether Borden's milk sales at substantially low
prices, or at prices below cost were for the purpose of eliminating or
lessening competition, thus constituting illegal price discrimination.
Pursuant to FTC's requests, Borden furnished information and documentary evidence regarding the sales. However, FTC subsequently issued a complaint charging Borden with effecting illegal price stabilization. Borden requested dismissal of the complaint for violation of
FTC Rule 2.6,146 which provides:
143. Id. at 1132.
144. The denial of cross-examination arose in the context of whether measures
taken by HUD to prevent perpetuation of racial segregation were adequate to that end.

The court indicated that this was an "issue involving expert opinion and forecasts which
cannot be decisively resolved by testimony."
359 F.2d 624 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
145. 495 F.2d 785 (7th Cir. 1974).
146. 16 C.FR. § 2.6 (1974).

Id., citing American Airlines, Inc. v. CAB,
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Any person under investigation compelled or requested to furnish
information or documentary evidence shall be advised with respect
to the purpose and scope of the investigation.
Borden claimed that it had not been given proper notice of the scope
of the investigation and had been denied the opportunity to submit exculpatory materials which might have aborted the issuance of the administrative complaint.
The administrative law judge refused to dismiss. Borden then applied to the district court for a preliminary injunction. The district
court denied injunctive relief and dismissed Borden's complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The Seventh Circuit affirmed,
holding that the issue of the procedural propriety of steps taken during
the investigatory stage'4 7 leading to an administrative complaint could
14
be raised on appeal from FTC's final order.
An important question is left unanswered by the opinion. Assuming that FTC had violated Rule 2.6, does such a violation necessarily
require termination of the FTC proceedings? The Administrative Procedure Act requires that the reviewing court take notice of the rule
of prejudicial error. Since Borden's complaint was directed at improper
notice of the scope of the investigation, which denied it an opportunity to present exculpatory materials, it would still have an opportunity at the "complaint" stage to establish exculpation. Thus, the cost
to Borden would appear to be substantially the same whether or not
the rule was violated.
Protection of the consumer prevailed over a seemingly harmless
advertising technique in Spiegel v. Federal Trade Commission. 49 The
FTC issued an administrative complaint' 5 ° charging Spiegel with using
147. Judicial review of proceedings of the Federal Trade Commission is governed
by 15 U.S.C. § 45(c) (1970), which provides for review of cease and desist orders by
the courts of appeals. Section 10(c) of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.
§ 704 (1966), provides:
Agency action made reviewable by statute ...
[is] subject to judicial review. A preliminary, procedural, or intermediate agency action or ruling not
directly reviewable is subject to review on the review of the final agency action.
(Emphasis added).
148. See also United States v. Lamars Dairy, 500 F.2d 84 (7th Cir. 1974), where
exhaustion of administrative remedies was required under the Agriculture Adjustment
Act; Granite City Steel Company v. Environmental Protection Agency, 501 F.2d 925
(7th Cir. 1974), where the court used the exhaustion doctrine to deny a collateral attack
on a final EPA compliance date; and Chicago & Northwestern Railway v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific Railroad, 502 F.2d 193 (7th Cir. 1974), where the court invoked the doctrine to utilize the Interstate Commerce Commission's expertise in deciding
the significance of cessation of operations by one of the railroads.
149. 494 F.2d 59 (7th Cir. 1974).
150. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(6) (1970).
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"false, misleading and deceptive statements" in its circulars and catalogs which had the "capacity and tendency" to mislead the public into
purchasing large quantities of merchandise on a "free trial" or "percent
off" basis. The gravamen of the FTC's charge was not a failure to
disclose credit approval requirements, but rather Spiegel's "inconspicuous disclosure" that the offers were subject to credit approval. Credit
approval requirements were stated on the catalogue order forms. Spiegel answered that its advertising followed the custom and usage of the
trade and denied deception and injury to customers or competition.
Following an evidentiary hearing, FTC issued a cease and desist order
which Spiegel sought to have set aside by the Seventh Circuit.' 5 1
Spiegel first contended that the order be set aside as too trivial
for FTC attention because there was no proof of injury to the public
or to Spiegel's competitors. The majority stressed in a moral tone the
"primacy of truthfulness in advertising" noting that proof of actual in52
jury was unnecessary to support a FTC cease and desist order.'
Judge Pell, in dissent, observed that the record revealed a de minimis
violation, if any, and would have set aside the order because of the
"utter triviality"'" of the matter, stating:
[E]ven though there be no proof of actual deception required,
there must be a showing that the acts and practices sought to be
proscribed are detrimental to the public interest in order to satisfy
the statutory requirement that the proceeding be in the public interest.15
Judge Pell found that the use of an "eyecatcher" was not detrimental
to the public interest so long as the rest of the advertising material put
the eyecatcher in proper perspective.
Spiegel then argued that FTC's order was not supported by the
evidence since FTC did not find that Spiegel stated the offers were
unconditional. The majority examined the circulars and catalogs in the
record and held that the evidence gave substantial support to FTC's
finding of a "capacity and tendency" to mislead the public. 15 Judge
151. 15 U.S.C. § 45(c) (1970).
152. 494 F.2d at 62.
153. Id. at 65. "The FTC conceded the correctness of the general rule that detriment to the public interest must be shown. Here, by issuing its order, the FTC has
ineffect found there was detriment to the public interest in the situation of deadbeats
being deceived into thinking that they are going to receive a free trial of, or a discount
on, merchandise which they could not reaslistically purchase on either a cash or a deferred basis. It is difficult to imagine a less egregious affront to the public interest."
Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 63.
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Pell agreed with Spiegel and concluded that in varying language, the
order form made it clear that all orders were subject to credit acceptance by Spiegel. Judge Pell reasoned that since there was neither
disclosure of an economic loss of any consequence nor consumers' testimony indicating a misunderstanding of Spiegel's credit disclosures, the
entry of the order was unwarranted on the record. The majority, however, stated that "a good society depends upon promises being kept",
and directed enforcement of FTC's order.
Since advertising catalogues and circulars are periodically revised,
the additional cost, if any, to Spiegel of complying with the FTC's order
would appear to be minimal. However, the record appears to have
been devoid of any evidence suggesting a misleading effect on the public. Additionally, according to Spiegel, competitors followed similar
practices. Complete candor in public offerings is obviously desirable,
and policy-making is the province of the FTC. Viewed in this manner,
the majority opinion properly declines to substitute its judgment for
that of the agency. It remains to be seen whether such deference will
likewise be accorded when a more substantive challenge is before the
court.
LABOR

In Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific R.R. Co. v. Wells,' 5 6 the railroad sought review of an order of the Railroad Adjustment Board.
The Board had denied, as untimely, the railroad's request for a third
extension of time to respond to Well's claim of improper discharge.
The request had been sent by mail. The postage meter mark was
timely, but the post mark was one day late. Otherwise the extension
would have been automatically granted under Board procedures. Accordingly, the Board defaulted the railroad, and without a hearing,
barred it from further participation in the proceedings. 15 7 However,
the Board did not pass on the merits of the employee's claim until three
and one-half years later, at which time the railroad sought judicial review15 8 as an aggrieved person under section 153 First (q) of the Railway Labor Act.' 59
156. 498 F.2d 913 (7th Cir. 1974).
157. Id. at 914.
158. On January 8, 1971, the railroad filed suit to enjoin the Board from conducting
further proceedings without affording the railroad an opportunity to defend.

However,

on October 7, 1971, in a memorandum opinion the district court dismissed the complaint
as premature, but without prejudice to renewal should the Board continue to deny the
railroad an opportunity to defend.
159. 45 U.S.C. § 153 First (q) (1970) provided:
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After hearing evidence on the Board's procedures for granting extensions and on the railroad's efforts -to make a timely request for extension, the district court ordered the Board to allow the railroad to
defend at a new hearing. The Board appealed, claiming that under
section 153 First (q), the "finding of an untimely request" was conclusive and 'thus non-reviewable. The court flatly rejected this assertion because of the "constitutional dimensions" of the procedural defect, concluding that the Board had violated the employer's fifth amendment rights: 160 "To find Plaintiff in default without giving it an
opportunity to establish that the [request] was timely, or if not, whether there were sufficient extenuating circumstances to warrant granting
161
the extension, is at best harsh action and at worst inexcusable."'
The court's conclusion rests on findings by the district court that,
in addition to the three automatic extensions, it was not unusual for
the Board to grant any number of discretionary extensions, that the record was totally devoid of any indication of prejudice to the Board's
consideration 1 62 of the merits by the "untimely" request, and that the
Board did not give the railroad an opportunity to explain the lateness
of its request. Certainly, the court's rejection of the Board's "finding"
First. There is established a Board, to be known as the "National Railroad Adjustment Board", the members of which shall be selected within thirty
days after June 21, 1934, and it is provided(q) If any employee or group of employees, or any carrier, is aggrieved
by the failure of any division of the Adjustment Board to make an award in
a dispute referred to it, or is aggrieved by any of the terms of an award or
by the failure of the division to include certain terms in such award, then such
employee or group of employees or carrier may file in any United States district court in which a petition under paragraph (p) could be filed, a petition
for review of the division's order. A copy of the petition shall be forthwith
transmitted by the clerk of the court to the Adjustment Board. The Adjustment Board shall file in the court the record of the proceedings on which it
based its action. The court shall have jurisdiction to affirm the order of the
division or to set it aside, in whole or in part, or it may remand the proceeding
to the division for such further action as it may direct. On such review, the
findings and order of the division shall be conclusive on the parties, except that
the order of the division may be set aside, in whole or in part, or remanded
to the division, for failure of the division to comply with the requirements of
this chapter, for failure of the order to conform, or confine itself, to matters
within the scope of the division's jurisdiction, or for fraud or corruption by a
member of the division making the order. The judgment of the court shall
be subject to review as provided in section 1291 and 1254 of Title 28.
160. The court did not refer to Citizens to Preserve Overton Park where the Supreme Court emphasized that non-reviewability is to be narrowly read if at all unless
there is clear and convincing legislative intent to the contrary.
161. 498 F.2d at 917.
162. Wells' claim had spawned prior litigation. See 498 F.2d at 913 n.l. In one
such opinion, disposing of the railroad's mandamus action seeking the convening of a
special panel to hear Wells' claim, the court had stated: "(T)he first Division should
make every effort to dispose of this overstale submission forthwith." 435 F.2d 339, 342
(7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 944 (1971).
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is correct despite the "conclusive" effect given to Board findings under
section 153 First (q). At the time the railroad mailed its request, the
Board had no official policy on timeliness of mailed requests. Thus,
the denial was not a factual finding, but rather an exercise of discretion.
Moreover, findings are generally based on evidence, and the Board
heard no evidence.
Local 134, IBEW v. NLRB, 63 raises the issue of what is an "impartial hearing officer" under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).
The union appealed from an order of the NLRB finding the union

to have committed an unfair labor practice in a jurisdictional dispute.
On the merits of the finding the Seventh Circuit stated: "We certainly
cannot say that the Board's decision was not supported by the controlling facts of the case."' 64 However, the union contended that the
Board violated section 5(d) of the APA 16 5 because the hearing officer
officer in the section 10(k) proceeding' 6 6 subsequently served in a
capacity as counsel at the section 8 Unfair Labor Practice
prosecutorial
167
Hearing.
Section 5(d) of the APA is clearly aimed at eliminating the practice of combining prosecutorial and judicial functions in one person.
163. 486 F.2d 863 (7th Cir. 1973).
164. Id. at 866.
165. § 5(d), 5 U.S.C. § 554(d) (1970), provides in part:
The employee who presides at the reception of evidence pursuant to section 556 of this title shall make the recommended decision or initial decision
required by section 557 of this title, unless he becomes unavailable to the
agency. Except to the extent required for the disposition of ex parte matters
as authorized by law, such an employee may not(1) consult a person or party on a fact in issue, unless on notice and opportunity for all parties to participate; or
(2) be responsible to or subject to the supervision or direction of an employee or agent engaged in the performance of investigative or prosecuting
functions for an agency.
An employee or agent engaged in the performance of investigative or prosecuting functions for an agency in a case may not, in that or a factually related
case, participate or advise in the decision, recommended decision, or agency
review pursuant to section 557 of this title, except as witness or counsel in publicproceedings.
166. § 10(K), 29 U.S.C. § 160(K) (1970), provides:
Whenever itis charged that any person has engaged in an unfair labor
practice within the meaning of paragraph (4)(D) of section 158(b) of this
title, the Board is empowered and directed to hear and determine the dispute
out of which such unfair labor practice shall have arisen, unless, within ten
days after notice that such charge has been filed, the parties to such dispute
submit to the Board satisfactory evidence that they have adjusted, or agreed
upon methods for the voluntary adjustment of, the dispute. Upon compliance
by the parties to the dispute with the decision of the Board or upon such voluntary adjustment of the dispute, such charge shall be dismissed.
167. 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1970). Unfair labor practices are set forth in 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(b) (1970); in the case at bar there was an alleged violation of 29 U.S.C. §
158(b)(4)(D) (1970).
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However, the Board first contended that section 5 was not violated because the 10(k) hearing "was without binding effect on anyone."' 16
Yet, the court noted that the hearing officer's rulings at the 10(k)
hearing make up the basis for the complaint and evidence subsequently
heard at the unfair labor practice hearing. The hearing officer's duties
included hearing the evidence adduced at the 10(k) hearing and "subsequently urging and relying upon it as prosecutorial evidence" if the
dispute was not settled: "We think that ,the knowledge on the part of
the presiding officer that he will subsequently advocate a position based
upon his own evidentiary ruling at the § 10(k) hearing could very well
influence his decisions at that hearing."169 Accordingly, despite the
Board's argument that the hearing officer completes his "judicial"
function prior to prosecution, the court concluded: "This commingling
of functions is plainly inconsistent with both the spirit and letter of the
Act [APA], and, we think, incompatible with the accepted norms for
the proper administration of justice. An order of the Board thus tainted
70
should not be enforced."'
The opinion is interesting for a number of reasons. The court
did agree that an unfair labor practice had been committed by the union, yet without any claim or showing of actual prejudice from the
"commingling" the court denied enforcement.' 7 ' Furthermore, there is
no indication in the opinion that the union raised the point in its proceedings before the Board. Nor was there any indication that "evidentiary" rulings at the 10(k) hearing precluded the union from reraising disputed points at the section 8 adversary hearing. Apparently
presuming prejudice, the court was concerned with the psychological
improbability of impartiality in view of the hearing officer's com72
mingled functions.
Although the parties did not contest the applicability of section
5(d) of the APA, the court resolved that it did apply. However, section 5(d) prohibits "commingling" of investigative or prosecutorial
functions with the decision-making function. 73 Certainly it is not clear
from the opinion that the 10(k) hearing officer's subsequent function
168. 486 F.2d at 866.
169. Id. at 867-68. The applicability of § 5(d) of the APA to 10(K) hearings was
not argued; however, the court resolved that it did apply. Id. at 867.

170. Id. at 868.
171. 5 U.S.C.A. § 706 (1970) does provide that "due account shall be taken of the
rule of prejudicial error." Perhaps the court felt that this prejudice was to be presumed.
172. The court quoted from Justice Jackson's remarks to this effect in Wong Yang
Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 44 (1950). 486 F.2d at 867.
173. 5 U.S.C. § 554(d) (1970).
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as counsel at an adversary hearing constitutes the prohibited participation in the decision making process since it is the Board who makes
the final decision. In fact, section 5(d) seems, on its face, to permit
the 10(k) officer to further participate as "counsel in public proceedings."1'74 Accordingly, it remains to be seen what impact this case will
have on those agencies subject to section 5(d) of the APA.
TRANSPORTATION

Though the Interstate Commerce Commission qCC) generally
does not have authority to order the payment of refunds under the Motor Carrier Act, the Seventh Circuit upheld such an order in Aluminum
Company of America v. Admiral Merchants Motor Freight.'7 5 Defendant motor carriers had filed a proposed rate increase with the
76
ICC.X
ICC permitted an interim increase, but set the matter for an
evidentiary hearing to determine the propriety of the increased rates.
Two government agencies and the carriers requested a continuance
of the evidence filing date and the hearing date claiming that the evidence could not be prepared in time. ICC granted the continuance
on the condition that the carriers refund the interim rate increase to
the shippers if the ICC did not ultimately approve the increased rates.
The carriers protested the conditional continuance but then withdrew
their objection. Thereafter, ICC denied permanent rate increases and
ordered that refunds be paid to the shippers. The carriers challenged
the validity of ICC's refund order, but it was upheld by a three-judge
court in Colorado and subsequently upheld by the United States Su177
preme Court on appeal.
Plaintiff-shipper then sought enforcement of the refund order.
The district court found defendant motor carriers to be in privity with
the Colorado plaintiff carriers and held them estopped from challenging the validity of the refund order. Summary judgment was entered
for the shipper, 1 78 and the carriers appealed.
The Seventh Circuit, affirming the district court's findings of priv174. See note 168 supra.

175. 486 F.2d 717 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1113 (1974).
176. Motor carriers file proposed rates with the ICC. These rates go into effect
unless the ICC suspends, cancels or otherwise prevents their becoming effective. The
Commission may also suspend the increase pending a hearing. See 49 U.S.C. § 316(g)
(1938).

177. Admiral Merchants Motor Freight, Inc. v. United States, 321 F. Supp. 353 (D.
Colo. 1971), affd, 404 U.S. 802 (1971).

178. Aluminum Company of America v. Admiral Merchants Motor Freight, 337 F.
Supp. 674 (N.D. Ill.
1972).
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ity and estoppel, considered the issue of whether ICC's refund order
was enforceable as an order to pay money within section 16(2) of the
Interstate Commerce Act.1 79 The district court had held that section
205(g) of Part II of the Act'8 0 incorporated section 16(2) of Part I
of the Act thereby providing plaintiff with a statutory remedy for enforcement of the refund order."" Defendants argued that this "incorporation" had no basis in law, emphasizing the complete lack of any
evidence indicating congressional intent for creation of such a remedy
and the fact that not a single case existed in which section 205(g) was
utilized to create a cause of action by incorporation of section 16.182
The court noted:
We are mindful of the fact that the Commission, 'as a generally
accepted procedure,' does not have statutory authority to order the
payment of refunds under the Motor Carrier Act and that the refund order in question was only justified on the basis of the Commission's procedural powers, coupled with the equitable estoppel
and waiver
conditions which were found to exist by the three-judge
1 83
panel.
But it could see no reason why ICC's order should not be enforced.
The Seventh Circuit held that, having accepted the benefits afforded
by the continuance of the rate hearing, the defendants were now required to provide the agreed-upon exchange, i.e., the rate refunds.'
In a related case, Container Corporationof America v. Admiral
Merchants Motor Freight,18 5 the defendant motor carriers asserted
that the statute of limitations had run on enforcement of the ICC refund orders found valid in Alcoa. The district court dismissed the
179. 49 U.S.C. § 16(2) (1970) provides in part:
If a carrier does not comply with an order for the payment of money
within the time limit in such order, the complainant, or any person for whose
benefit such order was made, may file in the district court of the United States
for the district in which he resides or in which is located the principal operating office of the carrier, or through which the road of the carrier runs, or in
any State court of general jurisdiction having jurisdiction of the parties, a com-

plaint setting forth briefly the causes for which he claims damages, and the
order of the commission in the premises ....
See 321 F. Supp. at 356 n.8, 357.

180. Section 205(g), 49 U.S.C. § 305(g) (1970), provides in part:
Any final order made under this part [§301-305, 306-327 of this title]
shall be subject to the same right of relief in court by any party in interest

as is now provided in respect to orders of the Commission made under part
I.,
181. 337 F. Supp. at 681.

182.
183.
184.
185.

486 F.2d at 721.
486 F.2d at 722.
Id.
489 F.2d 825 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied 94 S. Ct. 1581 (1974).
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shippers' complaint holding that the action was barred by the one-year
limitations provision of the Act.'8 6
The Seventh Circuit found that the shippers had filed their complaint well before judicial review of ICC's order had been completed,
but more than one calendar year after ICC had entered its order directing the refund. The court held that the proper date for purposes of limitations was the date on which the litigation prosecuted by
the carriers to obtain judicial review of ICC's order was completed.
That litigation was, in effect, a continuation of the carriers' efforts to7
1
persuade ICC itself to modify or set aside its original refund order.
The court reasoned that:
It would 'be anomalous to hold that a Commission order is final 'before judicial review is completed if, but only if, review leaves the
Commission's order undisturbed.
No statutory policy would be served by requiring shippers to
incur the expense and inconvenience of filing protective suits prior
to the termination of the judicial proceedings initiated by the carriers to review the legality of the Commission's order.' 8
As such, the court deemed the action to have been filed even before
the limitations period began to run. Accordingly, the order dismissing
the complaint was reversed, and the case was remanded for further
proceedings consistent with Alcoa.
Because the carriers were estopped from challenging the validity
of the refund order, the Seventh Circuit did not attempt to decide whether the ICC could order motor carriers to pay refunds based on a subsequent determination of unreasonableness. Rather, the court referred to the estoppel as being coupled with the procedural powers of
the Commission. Certainly the ICC had the power to suspend the rate
increase pending investigation and hearing. 8 9 The Colorado threejudge court recognized that -the order in question was not unlike the
exercise of the suspension power which the Commission has under 49
U.S.C. § 316(g). 90 One can only wonder why the ICC chose not to
exercise this power. It is also undetermined whether the carriers could
186. 49 U.S.C. § 16(3)(f) (1970). Section 16(3)(f) provides:
A complaint for the enforcement of an order of the commission for the
payment of money shall be filed in the district court or the State court within
one year from the date of the order, and not after.
187. 489 F.2d at 828.
188. Id.
189. See 49 U.S.C. § 316(g) (1970).
190. 321 F. Supp. at 359
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have taken the conditional continuance order directly to court rather
than await completion of the ICC proceedings.
Voyager 1000 v. Civil Aeronautics Board'' involved CAB regulation of an "air travel club"'192 which consisted of an estimated 43,000
members, whose sole affinity appeared to be that of travel. Voyager
employed over eighty individuals, operated seven aircraft, and maintained extensive flight schedules. Mass media campaigns were undertaken to increase memberships with emphasis on the immediacy of eligibility for flight discounts solely upon payment of dues. CAB determined that the relevant characteristics of the club's operation brought
it within the definition of a common carrier, thereby requiring CAB
issuance of a certificate of convenience and necessity. CAB entered
an order directing Voyager to cease and desist from engaging in air
transportation in violation of section 401(a) of the Federal Aviation
Act.19 3 On review,'" the Seventh Circuit upheld the CAB's order,"'
finding no distinction between the individual ticket service and the
group service offered by Voyager.
In essence, the court found the CAB's definition of common carriage to be reasonable. The opinion does not indicate that the CAB
had found Voyager's operations to actually be injurious to the commercial airlines; rather such appears to be presumed. Judge Sprecher noted: "The economic stability of commercial airlines is to be preserved
not for the benefit of the airlines per se but only insofar as that stability
is necessary to the maintenance of an adequate national and interna191. 489 F.2d 792 (7th Cir. 1973).
192. 14 C.F.R. § 123.1(b) (1974) provides:
An air travel club is, by definition, a 'person who engages in the carriage by
airplanes of persons who are required to qualify for that carriage by payment
of an assessment, dues, membership fee, or other similar type remittance.'
193. § 401(a), 49 U.S.C. § 1371(a) (1970), provides in part:
Certificate of public convenience and necessity.-(a) Certificate required.-No
air carrier shall engage in any air transportation unless there is in force a certificate issued by the Board authorizing such air carrier to engage in such
transportation.
194. 49 U.S.C. § 1486(a) (1970) provides in part:
Orders of Board and Administrator subject to review.-Any order, affirmative
or negative, issued by the Board or Administrator under this Act shall be subject to review by the courts of appeals of the United States or the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia upon petition, filed Within sixty
days after the entry of such order, by any person disclosing a substantial interest in such order.
195. 49 U.S..C § 1486(e) (1970), which provides:
(e) Findings of fact conclusive.-The findings of facts by the Board or Administrator, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive. No objection to an order of the Board or Administrator shall be considered by the
court unless such objection shall have been urged before the Board or Administrator or, if it was not so urged, unless there were reasonable grounds for failure to do so,
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tional transportation system."' 6 However, in a brief concurring opinion, Judge Pell observed:
It is somewhat ironical, and perhaps to be deplored, that in a
society which generally encourages competitive free enterprise a
service is to be stifled which a substantial segment of citizenry of
the Midwest portion of the country found to be highly desirable in
making available travel by air which might not otherwise have
been enjoyed by them, and which travel has been conducted
in full
19 7
compliance with governmental safety requirements.
Since the CAB is required to foster sound economic conditions, promote efficient service at reasonable rates, and prevent destructive competitive practices in the field of air transportation, it would seem that
the court's acceptance of the CAB's evaluation is correct. However,
perhaps competition from a Voyager type operation would have benefited the individual ticket market.
The Seventh Circuit overturned another Department of Transportation safety regulation' 98 in Rex Chainbelt v. Volpe.199 The administrator of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
(NHTSA) promulgated regulations °" requiring "final-stage manufacturers" to (1) complete truck assemblies so that the trucks would conform to all applicable federal safety standards and (2) certify that the
entire vehicle conformed to applicable federal standards. NHTSA rejected Rex's objections to these regulations. Thereafter, Rex, a
final-stage manufacturer, filed a declaratory judgment action challenging the requirement that it certify the entire vehicle on grounds that
NHSTA had either exceeded its statutory power 20 ' or had enacted unreasonable regulations that would impose liability upon Rex under a
warranty theory for defects in equipment which it had not installed or
affected. The district court ruled against Rex on both grounds and entered summary judgment for NHSTA.
The Seventh Circuit found that NHSTA had the power to impose
additional certification requirements,2 02 but that the particular certifica196. 489 F.2d at 799 n.13.
197. Id. at 802.
198. See H & H Tire Co. v. Department of Transportation, 471 F.2d 350 (7th Cir.
1972), involving "retread" tire regulations. See also the comment thereon in 50 Cm.KENT L. REV. 214 (1973), in which H & H Tire was referred to as a case of "excessive
judicial review".
199. 486 F.2d 757 (7th Cir. 1973).
200. 49 C.F.R. § 568.6(a), (b) (1974).
201. National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381
et seq., 1403 (1966).
202. 486 F.2d at 759.
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tion regulations in issue were invalid as clearly contravening the language of the Act. The court reasoned:
[T]he regulations currently in effect relieve incomplete vehicle
manufacturers who sell their trucks to Rex customers of the duty to
certify their vehicles and to assume any legal liabilities that may be
imposed because of this certification. Congress has mandated that
the incomplete vehicle manufacturer conform to all applicable federal safety standards before selling his vehicles. §1397(a). We
believe that Congress intended certification to be a necessary adjunct to the enforcement of this requirement.
Therefore, to the extent that the regulations require Rex to
make -the sole certification of compliance of the entire vehicle and
contravene
the clear language of §1403, they must be declared in203
valid.
Notably, the court's holding did not decide the legal implications
raised by Rex of certifying a vehicle under either a warranty or negligent misrepresentation theory.2 °4 The court reasoned that NHSTA's
regulation relieved incomplete vehicle manufacturers of their duty to
certify and of any legal liabilities that might be imposed. However,
the court did recognize that the challenged regulations required incomplete vehicle manufacturers to supply Rex with a listing of all safety
standards which applied to equipment installed by them, including a
statement of whether such equipment conformed to the applicable
standards. 0 5 The question never answered by the court was whether
such duties imposed on the incomplete vehicle manufacturers amounted to the required certification. Moreover, the court's concern for
Rex's burden, without deciding liability implications, seems to be no
more than that Rex would have to take the initial brunt of a lawsuit.
The opinion does not mention whether Rex could, in turn, join the incomplete vehicle manufacturer at least as a third party defendant. An
injured plaintiff would probably join anyone who participated in the
manufacturing process. It would thus appear that ,the court has substituted its judgment for that of the agency.
A different judicial panel, in an opinion by Senior Judge Kiley,
203. 15 U.S.C. § 1407 (1970). Section 1407 of the Act provides:
The Secretary is authorized to issue, amend, and revoke such rules as he
deems necessary to carry out this subchapter.
Such a broad grant of authority enabling the Secretary to impose all requirements which
he deems "necessary" to facilitate his enforcement functions is indeed quite extensive.
Regulations promulgated pursuant to this delegation of power are to be upheld by a reviewing court if they conform to the purposes and policies of the Act and if they do
not contravene any of its terms.
204. 486 F.2d at 762 n.7.
205. Id. at 760 n.2,
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upheld a Department of Labor safety regulation to which Judge Pell
dissented. In National Roofing Contractors Association v. Brennan,20 6
the Secretary of Labor, pursuant to the Occupational Safety and Health
Act of 1970 (OSHA)2" 7 promulgated a regulation 2 8 to protect workers
on sloping roofs of buildings. The regulation provided that catch platforms be installed for all roofing work done more -than sixteen feet
from the ground, thus departing from the twenty foot standard for industry in general. Petitioners, an association of roofing subcontractors
and individual roofers, sought to have the Seventh Circuit 20 9 set aside
-theregulation on several grounds.
Petitioners argued that since only general contractors sat on the
advisory committee which promulgated the new standard, their interests were not represented in the rulemaking proceedings. The majority found no prejudicial error, if any error at all, viewing the interests
of petitioners and general contractors as "plainly the same." Judge
Pell, in vigorous dissent, felt petitioners were prejudiced since "on this
particular standard the roofers were not a subgroup but instead were
the only affected employers."210 Yet it was undisputed that the advisory committee did consider petitioner's objections before making its
final recommendation.
Petitioners next claimed that there was not substantial evidence
in the record viewed as a whole2 ' justifying departure from the old
twenty foot standard, and that therefore, the agency's action was capricious, arbitrary, and unreasonable. The majority held that it was
clearly within the Secretary's discretion 12 to promulgate a safer
206. 495 F.2d 1294 (7th Cir. 1974).
207. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651 et seq. (1970).
208. 29 C.F.R. § 1926 (1974), § 451(u)(3). The safety standard provides that:
A catch platform shall be installed below the working area of roofs more than
16 feet from the ground to eaves with a slope greater than 4 inches in 12
inches without a parapet. In width, the platform shall extend 2 feet beyond
the protection of the eaves and shall be provided with a guardrail, midrail, and
toeboard. This provision shall not apply where employees engaged in work
upon such roofs are protected by a safety belt attached to a lifeline.
209. 29 U.S.C. § 655(f) (1970) provides in pertinent part:
[Any person who may be adversely affected by a standard issued under
this section may at any time prior to the sixtieth day after such standard is
promulgated file a petition challenging the validity of such standard with the
United States court of appeals for the circuit wherein such person resides or
has his principal place of business, for a judicial review of such standard.
210. 495 F.2d at 1300.

211.

29 U.S.C. § 655(f) (1970) provides in pertinent part:

The determinations of the Secretary shall be conclusive if supported by sub-

stantial evidence in the record considered as a whole.
212. 29 U.S.C. § 655(a) (1970) provides in pertinent part:

mhe Secretary shall, as soon as practicable during the period beginning
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standard and that his determination was supported by the record.
Judge Pell questioned ,the benefits of the new standard based on his
examination of the record. Since cost factors were required to be considered, Judge Pell concluded that the additional cost to petitioners,
and, ultimately, to consumers, outweighed the additional "protection"
afforded workers.
Petitioners' final argument challenged the new standard as being
impermissibly vague in view of OSHA criminal sanctions and claimed
that it denied them equal protection of the law. The majority found
no merit in either contention, and agreed with the Secretary that all
persons doing the same kind of work were subject to the sixteen foot
standard, even though only the roofing construction industry would be
presently affected by the remedial standard. Accordingly, the petition
was denied.
Judge Pell again strongly dissented, particularly to the majority's
dismissal of petitioner's vagueness contentions. During the agency
hearings, petitioners had noted the substantial costs from the proposed
regulation. The record indicated that the need for a "catch platform"
might be obviated if the roofer constructed a temporary parapet. 18
Whether this less costly alternative would suffice appeared to depend
on site examinations by OSHA compliance officers. Judge Pell felt
that in view of the drastic enforcement potential of OSHA whereby
heavy fines could be summarily imposed and criminal penalties sought,
the rule was impermissibly vague.
This case requires further examination. Judge Pell's dissent is
particularly persuasive and draws special attention to the question of
the proper composition of OSHA advisory committees.
GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

While it is difficult and, perhaps, even inappropriate to attempt
to draw any conclusions from such a broad spectrum of cases, a few
observations can be made. The reported decisions exhibit a definite
tendency -to expand judicial review to encompass most, if not all, administrative action. Contentions of non-reviewability were consistently
with the effective date of this chapter and ending two years after such date,
by rule promulgate as an occupational safety or health standard any national
consensus standard . . . unless he determines that the promulgation of such
a standard would not result in improved safety or health for specifically designated employees.
213. See note 208 supra.
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rejected. In fact, from the opinons, it is difficult -to see the court upholding nonreviewability claims in the absence of a clear legislative
statement to that effect.
The Seventh Circuit was also generally consistent in its insistence
that the administrative process develop a complete record upon which
the courts could perform their review function. In instances of reviewing quasi-legislative agency action, the court generally insisted that the
record reveal the basis upon which such a decision was made. Moreover, the opinions indicate little judicial reluctance to review the procedures utilized by the agency in arriving at its decision. In sum, it
would appear to be a fair characterization, as partially evidenced by
the number of reversals, that the Seventh Circuit tends to be aggressive
in its review of administrative action.

